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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Thomas T. Melvin, Jr. appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of lewd conduct.

Melvin claims, for the first time on

appeal, that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by
allegedly misstating the evidence. Melvin also claims the district court abused its
sentencing discretion.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Melvin with lewd conduct with a minor under 16 for
having genital-to-genital contact with ten-year-old Z.G.

(R. 1 , pp.8-9, 20-21.)

Melvin pied not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.22, 31-39.) The
jury found Melvin guilty of lewd conduct and the court imposed a unified 12-year
sentence with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. 2

(R., pp.43, 63-64.)

Melvin timely appealed from the judgment. (R., pp.66-67.)

Page citations to the record in this case correspond to the electronic page
number, not the handwritten page number.
1

2

At the conclusion of the review period, the court relinquished jurisdiction and
ordered Melvin's sentence executed. (Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and
Imposing Sentence, filed January 9, 2015 (file folder).)

1

ISSUES

Melvin states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of
fundamental error, by arguing facts not in evidence?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed
upon Mr. Melvin a sentence that is excessive given any view
of the facts?

(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Melvin failed to show prosecutorial misconduct,
misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error?

2.

Has Melvin failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
imposing a unified 12-year sentence, with five years fixed, upon the jury
verdict finding Melvin guilty of lewd conduct?

2

much

less

ARGUMENT
I.

Melvin Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His
Unpreserved Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal Melvin argues that the prosecutor made

statements during closing argument that constituted prosecutorial misconduct
and amounted to fundamental error.

Specifically, he contends that the

prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing facts that were not in evidence.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-11.)

This claim is without merit.

A review of the

challenged remarks shows no misconduct, much less misconduct rising to the
level of fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
Whether the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115
Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989).

C.

Melvin Has Failed To Show Any Prosecutorial Misconduct, Much Less
Misconduct Amounting To Fundamental Error
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes

fundamental error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196
(Ct. App. 2010). In the absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to
remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the
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defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right

a fair trial in a fair tribunal."
976 (2010).

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961,

Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant

demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights
were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record,
"without the need for any additional information" including information "as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must
demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally
by showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the
trial proceedings." 1J:L. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Melvin argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level
of fundamental error by using the words "grabbed" and "led" during closing
argument. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-9.) Melvin, however, has failed to show error,
much less fundamental error. Indeed, a review of the record and the applicable
law shows that the arguments singled out are entirely proper and, as such,
Melvin has failed to satisfy even the first prong of the fundamental error analysis.
A prosecutor has considerable latitude in closing argument, and is entitled
to argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009).

State v.

If a prosecutor

"attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the
jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial," and may be reviewed for
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fundamental error. State v. Beeks, 2015 WL 4079448 (Idaho App. July

2015)

(quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979).
In this case, Melvin contends the prosecutor misstated the evidence by
using the words "grabbed" and "led" during his closing argument. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.7-11.) According to Melvin, such language misstated the evidence and
evidences the prosecutors "clear" efforts "to prove the intent element based on
evidence that was not in the record."

(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-9.)

Melvin is

incorrect.
In order to provide context, the prosecutor's comments must be reviewed
in light of the entire trial. During opening statements, the prosecutor told the jury
that Z.G. would testify
that on July 18th , 2013, about 1:00 a.m., Mr. Melvin came into her
bedroom and asked her to go somewhere, and he takes her -leads her out of the bedroom. They start to leave the house. He
tells her to get a blanket, which you'll see later was a Tinkerbell
children's blanket. She grabbed her blanket, and they left their
house. You'll hear her state also that when they left the house it
was dark outside. That Mr. Melvin led her across the street,
through an alley, over to an unfinished home in Grangeville,
probably, oh, two, 300 feet away from their home. That Mr. Melvin
led [her] into this unfinished home where - where you'll hear
testimony nobody was living there. It was unfinished. It was under
construction. That he leads her into the home, up some steps, into
a room in this unfinished home. That he then lays down a tent, just
a regular camping tent, pretty good size tent, lays that down on the
floor of one of the unfinished rooms and leads [Z.G.] over to that
area. She'll then testify that he took his clothes off -- all of his
clothes, and then took all of her clothes off, and that then he places
her on top of him. She'll testify that, again, they were both naked.
That her vagina touched his penis for about a minute, and then she
asked him to get off - get off from being on top of her. He did.

5

(Supp. Tr. 3 , p.62, L.5 - p.63, L.5.)
Defense counsel responded to the prosecutor's opening statement by
agreeing that the testimony the jury would hear would be "exactly what" the
prosecutor said and indicated that he did not "dispute that the witnesses in this
case are going to say what [the prosecutor] said." (Supp. Tr., p.69, Ls.11-14.)
Consistent with what the prosecutor outlined in his opening statement,
and what defense counsel agreed would be said, Z.G. testified that Melvin led 4
her across the street to an unfinished home and engaged in lewd conduct with
her. On direct examination, Z.G. testified:
Was there a time on -- sometime in the morning of July 18th ,
2013, that ... Mr. Melvin came to your bedroom?
Q.

A. Yes.
Q. And do you remember about what time that was?

A. No.
Q. Would it be in the early morning?

A. Yeah.
Q. And what did he do when he came into your bedroom?

A. He got me up, and then he told me to get a blanket, so I did.
And then I went out to ... the front room. He grabbed the tent and
some other stuff, and then he took me out of the house.

3

There are two transcripts included in the record on appeal. The transcript
including the evidence presented at trial and the sentencing hearing will be
referred to as "Tr.," and the transcript containing the opening statements, closing
arguments, as well as other proceedings will be referred to as "Supp. Tr."
Because the word "lead" fairly and accurately describes what Melvin did in
relation to removing Z.G. from the home, the state will continue to use the word
"led" despite Melvin's position that the word is objectionable on the facts of this
case.
4
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Q. Okay. So, did he ask you to get a blanket?

A. Yes.
Q. And then he took a tent with him, right?

A. Yes.
Q. And then when he took you outside where did you go?

A. Across the road.
Q. And then after you crossed the road where did you go?

A. Into this unfinished house.
Q. It was being built; is that right?

A. Yes.
Q. And did your -- did Mr. Melvin take you into that unfinished
house?

A. Yes.
Q. And did he take you into one of the rooms?

A. Yes.
Q. What happened when he took you into one of the rooms?

A. He laid out ... the part that you put under the tent, and he laid it
down, and the he told me to lay down. So, I got my blanket down,
and then I covered up under it, and then he took off my clothes,
and then he took off his.
Q. At any point did you get on top of him, or did he get on top of
you?

A. He got on top of me.
(Tr., p. 10, L. 19 - p. 12, L. 10.)
Z.G. then testified that Melvin touched his penis to her vagina, for about
one minute, until Z.G. told him to get off of her. (Tr., p.12, L.11 - p.13,
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16.)

Z.G. told Melvin she wanted to go home because it was cold and dark, but
Melvin did not want to go, so Z.G. stayed for a while longer, but eventually left at
which time she encountered an officer who was searching for her because her
mother reported her and Melvin missing. (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-20, p.32, L.18-p.34,
L.11, p.74, L.11 - p.76, L.25.)

Z.G. also testified that, before the abuse

occurred, Melvin took her to "an area to get a drink" of water and told her to stay
by a van while he took a handful of pills that he got from some prescription
bottles he had with him. (Tr., p.13, L.17 - p.14, L.2, p.30, L.14 - p.31, L. 15,
p.43, Ls.6-25.)
During closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the evidence that
supported a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Melvin touched Z.G. with
sexual intent. (Supp. Tr., p.97, L.14- p.101, L.1.) The prosecutor stated:
First of all, let's look at the time that this happened. 1:00 a.m. in
the morning Mr. Melvin goes into [Z.G.'s] bedroom to get her up,
and then he -- before he leaves he asks her to get a blanket. Well,
what was his intent there? You decide. Why does he want her to
bring a blanket over there? Also, he bring[s a] tent. He brings - he
brings this tent that was laid out. Does that go to his intent? I
would argue that it does. Why does a person bring a tent over to a
secluded home? It goes to what his intent was. He takes [Z.G.] to
a secluded location, an unfinished home, a home under
construction, where nobody is living.
It's not finished.
The
testimony was it was dark, dark in there. He takes her -- he takes
her, I would submit, to a place that nobody can see what's going
on. That goes to his intent, his intent to arouse his sexual desires.
Once he gets to the secluded room he puts the tent on the floor.
He gets -- he takes his clothes off, and he takes [Z.G.'s] clothes off.
What does that show? That shows his intent, his intent to commit
a sexual act with [Z.G.], an intent to arouse his sexual desires.
What other meaning could that have, to take your clothes off and
take [Z.G.'s] clothes off? There is no other purpose for that other
than the intent to arouse your desires. He lays on top of her. What
does that go to? I mean, he's naked. She's naked. He lays on top
of her. I mean, what other intent, a naked man laying on a 10 or an
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11-year-old child, what other intent is there? It's clear. And he lays
on top of her not just for a second, for a minute. Her testimony was
for a minute. That he lays on top of her, and not just lays on top of
her, his penis touches her vagina for that minute. That was the
testimony . . .. What does that show you? What intent does that
show to you? And I would ask you to use your own common
sense, your own -- your own learning in life, what you know about
life, you know, ·use that. What does all these [sic] things show? It
show what his intent was. This wasn't an accident, I would submit
to you. It wasn't an accident that he took his clothes off. It wasn't
an accident that he took her clothes off. It wasn't an accident that
he laid on top of her for a minute. It wasn't an accident that his
penis touched her vagina for a minute. That's not an accident.
Another factor, Exhibit No. 22, this is what's called KY Jelly.
And you heard -- you heard [an officer] state what that is; that that's
a personal lubricant for sexual activity, basically, is what he testified
to. I would ask you to look at these when you go back to the jury
room. The purple one says mine, and then underneath that it says
for her. The blue one says yours, for him, personal lubricant. You
can read what the purpose is for that, and I would submit to you,
why does - why does an adult male bring this personal sexual
lubricant with him to a secluded home in the dark and do all these
things and have that? ...
I would submit to you, any one of these -- I've told you 10
different circumstances which indicate intent, and I would submit to
you, any one of those shows what his intent was on its own. And
you add all 10 of those together, it's just -- it's overwhelming what
the circumstantial evidence is regarding his intent, what as in his
mind when he does all these things. It's -- there's no other
explanation for it, and you have no other explanation. It can only
mean one thing, and that's he led her over there, did all these
things, brought the lubricant, to arouse his sexual interest, his
sexual desires.
(Supp. Tr., p.97, L.21 - p.101, L.1 (emphasis added).)
Melvin's claim of misconduct is based, in part, on the italicized sentence
above, cited without context, with an emphasis on the phrase, "he led her over
there." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Melvin relies on this sentence in conjunction with
three other snippets from the prosecutor's closing remarks as evidence of the
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prosecutor's alleged malfeasance. The other snippets Melvin cites are detailed
below.
In discussing Instruction No. 12 regarding voluntary intoxication, the
prosecutor explained:
But the only evidence was that [Z.G.], at one point I believe they
had gone across the street and he had gotten a drink of water, and
she said that he picked up some pills and took those pills, a
handful of pills. But there's one - I think some interesting points
about that. My recollection of [Z.G.'s] testimony -- there was
actually two parts to that. On direct examination she testified that
Mr. Melvin took -- basically took her, led her over to the house, or
they walked together over to the house with the tent and the
blanket, and when they get to the house they go inside. He puts
the tent down. He does all these things that I've already described,
that you've heard. He gets on top. Has the genital to genital
contact. She says to get off after about a minute, and he does. My
recollection of her testimony on direct examination was, that then at
that point they both walk over, back over to were her house is. And
I believe it was either her house or a neighbor's house. He goes to
a hose. Gets a drink out of the hose. Takes the handful of pills,
but what's important about that testimony is that that happened,
him taking the pills happened after the genital to genital contact
already happened. So, it happened right from the very beginning.
So, any effect those pills -- the pills were taken after the act, so
they wouldn't have had any effect on his mind anyway.
Now, I think on cross-examination, I think there was a little
bit of a change to that, where she said - she clarified that she
believed that they had gone to the house the first time, I believe,
and then went over across the street and he had the -- he took a
drink from the hose, then took the handful of pills. Then went right
back -- right back to the home, and then that's when the act
occurred. So, there was a little bit of difference there, but I would
submit to you either version from her on that testimony still shows
that any pills that he took wouldn't have any effect on him, because
if you believe the version that was brought up in cross-examination,
that they went to the home and them Mr. Melvin decided he wanted
to go get a drink .... And he went and got the drink, and then they
immediately ... went back to the home, and then the sexual act
occurred . . .. So, if you believe that version -- again, the taking of
the pills happened within a minute or two of the commission of the
sexual act. So, use your own common sense, life experiences,
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whether you think the pills would have any effect on him within a
minute or two of taking them.
(Supp.

, p.103, L.20 - p.105,

1 (emphasis added).)

At the conclusion of his closing, in asking the jury to return a guilty verdict,
the prosecutor stated:
I would ask you to please look at those instructions when
you go back there. I think obviously the intent issue here is
probably the main issue. Please consider -- consider everything
that you heard yesterday regarding the intent and all these things
and the KY Jelly and all the things Mr. Melvin did. When you think
about this, it was planned out. This was planned. You grab a
child. You take her in the dark. You got to a secluded home. You
do all these things. You get naked. You get her naked. You get
on top of her. It's all planned. Is he able to physically do all these
things? Yes. No problems whatsoever. Is he able to instruct her
to go get a blanket? Yes. No problems. It's all planned. It's all
clear, and it's beyond any doubt. Based upon all that, ladies and
gentlemen, I would ask you to find Mr. Melvin guilty of lewd conduct
with a minor child.
(Supp. Tr., p.108, L.11 - p.109, L.2 (emphasis added).)
Finally, in rebuttal, in response to defense counsel's argument that Melvin
lacked intent because he was "sleepwalking" during the incident, the prosecutor
said:
Use your common sense. Can you do all the things that Mr. Melvin
did. Wake up [at] 1:00 a.m. Go to your stepdaughter's bedroom.
Get her up. Go - and as you - before you leave the house you tell
this child, get a blanket, the Tinkerbell blanket. [Z.G.], get a
blanket. He didn't mumble when he said that. He didn't trip over
his words. He said, go get a blanket. She goes. She gets a
blanket. Is that planning? He says there's no evidence that was
planning. This is what they call circumstantial evidence. Use your
own common sense, life experiences. Is it planning to [say], [Z.G.],
go get a blanket? He grabs this tent from the house. Is that
planning? Yes, that's planning. That goes -- is that important? It
goes to intent. What was his intent in doing all these things? Can
you do this sleepwalking? Grab the tent. Tells [Z.G.] to get the
blanket. Grab the fly, which was not attached to the tent when they
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found it. Carry those. Bring the black case with the KY Jelly. Why
is that over there? Does that go to intent? Absolutely. Is that
planning? Absolutely.
You'll be able to take these photos back to the jury room.
He takes the girl, leads her down the steps. Can you do that
sleepwalking? Leads her across the street, though a gravel
alleyway, over to a rocky area where she said she was scared.
There was big rocks. Then there were smaller walks [sic]. That
she was scared where she was walking. It was dark. She was
scared she would trip. Walk through those rocks, this rocky area.
Walk into this garage of this unfinished home. Walk up these
stairs, all in the dark. Walk into this room. Take the tent, lay the
tent on the ground. Not sure where the blanket was. The KY is
down by his feet in a case. Take all your clothes off.... Take
[Z.G.'s] clothes off. Get on top of her for a minute. Put your penis
on her vagina for a minute until she finally says, stop. You only
have your common sense, your life experiences. Can you do all
that sleepwalking? And does that show intent? Absolutely, that
shows intent.
(Supp. Tr., p.120, L.22-p.122, L.12 (emphasis added).)
In arguing that "none of th[e] statements" italicized above "were supported
by evidence adduced at trial," Melvin relies on the following excerpts from
defense counsel's cross-examination of Z.G.:
Q. And where did you get the blanket from?

A My bed.
Q. Your bed.
blanket?

Okay, and did he tell you where to go with the

A No.
Q. Okay. But you went to the front room?

A Yes.
Q. Okay. Did he push you into the front room, pull you in -- hold
your hand?

A No, I walked.
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(Tr., p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.7 (cited in Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9).)
Q. Okay. And at that point you left the house; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, and did [Melvin] tell you where you were supposed to
go?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Did he lead you by the hand?
A. No.
Q. Push you in a direction?

A. No.

(Tr., p.25, Ls.11-20 (cited in Appellant's Brief, p.9).)
Melvin contends, for the first time on appeal, that because Z.G. denied
Melvin "pushed her, led her, told her where to go, or held her hand," the
prosecutor could not use the words "led" or "grab" in his closing arguments.
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

Melvin's argument ignores what is obvious from the

context of the prosecutor's statements as well as the actual definition of the word
"lead" (or "led"). The definition of the word "lead" includes "to guide on a way
especially by going in advance"; "to direct on a course or in a direction"; "to guide
someone

or

something

along

a

way";

"to

be

first."

www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/lead. Both a common understanding of the word lead in
the manner the prosecutor used it and the word's definition support the
conclusion that it was an appropriate word to describe Melvin's behavior in this
case.

That Melvin has decided on appeal that the prosecutor intended some

other meaning is unsupported by the record and his assertion that the
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prosecutor's use of the word deprived him of his right to a fair trial is, at best,
disingenuous. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 P.3d 414, 439
(2009) (appellate courts will not "lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an

ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting
through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less
damaging interpretations").
Melvin's argument that the prosecutor's single use of the word "grab" in
referring to Z.G. constitutes misconduct also fails.

Reading the prosecutor's

statements as a whole does not support Melvin's assertion that the prosecutor
used the word "grab" in some nefarious way in order to prove intent. Although
Z.G. did not testify that Melvin physically grabbed her, it is apparent from the
context that the prosecutor was not arguing such. Rather, the word was used in
the non-literal sense to communicate that Melvin took, or led, Z.G. out of the
house and across the street where he engaged in lewd conduct. Melvin's claim
that the prosecutor "attempted to convince the jury" that Melvin "had specific
intent to sexually abuse Z.G." by misstating the evidence is without merit.
Even if Melvin could satisfy the first prong of Perry, his argument does not
survive scrutiny under the second or third prongs because the error he
complains of is not clear on the record and the alleged error, if any, is harmless.
With respect to the second prong, the error is not plain from the record because,
contrary to the applicable legal standards, it requires the Court to interpret the
prosecutor's word choice in the most damaging way. Severson, supra. Further,
it assumes there was no strategic reason for counsel not to object even though
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there are several reasons counsel may have declined to do so. For example,
counsel may have elected not to object because he did not assign the most
damaging meaning to the prosecutor's word, or because the prosecutor's choice
of words did not undermine Melvin's sleepwalking defense, or because defense
counsel did not think an objection was warranted under the circumstances. On
appeal, Melvin offers no substantive argument that he met his burden under the
second prong of Perry. Instead, he asserts, in conclusory fashion: "[t]hese due
process violations are apparent from the face of the record and are clear
violations of well-established law." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Stating the error is
"clear" does not make it so, and falls far short of Melvin's burden of showing the
error he alleges is "clear or obvious" "without the need for any additional
information" including information "as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Finally, Melvin has failed to meet is burden of showing the statements he
complains of affected the outcome of the proceedings. First, the court instructed
the jury that "[t]he arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence"
(Supp. Tr., p.87, Ls.9-10), which cured any alleged error. State v. Abdullah, 158
Idaho 386, _ , 348 P.3d 1, 59 (2015). Second, as Melvin concedes on appeal,
his "entire defense" was premised on his claim that he was sleepwalking and,
therefore, did not have the requisite intent (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) The jury
obviously rejected this defense and, based on the evidence presented, would
have done so with or without the prosecutor's use of the words "led" or "grab" in
relation to Z.G. Further, the prosecutor's discussion of intent did not hinge solely
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on the assertion that Melvin led and/or grabbed Z.G. and took her across the
street. The prosecutor catalogued a number of actions taken by Melvin, which
Melvin did not dispute, that supported a finding that he had the requisite intent.
These actions included telling Z.G. to bring a blanket with her, and Melvin
bringing a tent and KY Jelly, taking Z.G. to a secluded area outside of the home
in the middle of the night, telling Z.G. to remove her clothes, taking off his own
clothes, and putting his penis on Z.G.'s vagina until she told him to stop. (Supp.
Tr., p.120, L.11 - p.122, L.24.) This conduct, even without using the words "led,"
"lead," or "grab" support the jury's finding that Melvin was guilty of lewd conduct.
A review of the record shows Melvin has failed to meet his burden of
showing error under any prong of Perry.

11.
Melvin Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion

A

Introduction
Melvin contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing a

unified 12 year sentence with five years fixed.

(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) More

specifically, Melvin argues his sentence is excessive given his "relatively minor
criminal history," "mental illness," the "unusual" facts of this case, and "the fact
that his psychosexual evaluation places him at a moderate low risk to reoffend."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) To the contrary, the district court acted well within
its discretion and consistent with the objectives of sentencing; Melvin has failed
to meet his burden of showing otherwise.
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B.

Standard Of Review
A district court's sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27,218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In Imposing
A Unified 12-Year Sentence, With Five Years Fixed, Upon The Jury
Verdict Finding Melvin Guilty Of Lewd Conduct
In order to demonstrate an abuse of the district court's sentencing

discretion, Melvin must "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts,
the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment."
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

Those

objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the
public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728,
730 (1978). Melvin cannot meet his burden in this case.
In imposing sentence, the district court recited the objectives of
sentencing and indicated it considered "everything" in deciding what sentence to
impose.

(Tr., p.174, Ls.4-17, p.175, Ls.3-4.)

On appeal, Melvin claims the

district court imposed an excessive sentence given his "relatively minor criminal
history," "mental illness," the "unusual" facts of this case, and "the fact that his
psychosexual evaluation places him at a moderate low risk to reoffend."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.)

All of this information was, however, before the

district court and considered by the court in imposing sentence, and none of the
information compels a lower sentence.

That Melvin disagrees with how the

district court weighed the evidence and balanced the objectives of sentencing
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does not show an abuse of discretion. See State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873,
879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011) ("In this case, Windom essentially asks this Court
to re-weigh the evidence presented to the district court and reach a different
conclusion . . .. However, our role is not to reweigh the evidence considered by
the district court; our role is to determine whether reasonable minds could reach
the same conclusion as did the district court.").
Based on the nature of the offense, Melvin's character, and the objectives
of sentencing, a unified 12-year sentence with five years fixed is not excessive
under any reasonable view of the facts.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Melvin guilty of lewd conduct.
DATED this 21 st day of September, 2015.

JESSICA
M. LORELLO
V
Deputy Attorney General
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